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Abstract
A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are 
substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a 
shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding 
of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time in-
dependently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children 
begin to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time 
as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged two to three years may 
categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not 
be able to understand that whether an event is in the future or in the past is something that changes 
as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around four to five years, children understand 
how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different 
locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system.
Keywords
Time perception, interval timing, temporal frameworks, tense, temporal-causal reasoning, event-
independent thought about time
1.  Introduction
A basic distinction can be made between two ways in which time features in peo-
ple’s mental lives: as a dimension of things that unfold in time, and as a framework 
within which those things can be located. Psychological studies of the former fo-
cus on people’s ability to process and represent information about the amount 
of time that events last for. However, events do not just have specific durations, 
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they also have temporal locations, just as objects do not only have spatial extent, 
they also have spatial locations. Thus, we can talk about temporal frameworks — 
systems for representing temporal locations — in the same way as we can talk 
about spatial frameworks (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999). The most familiar tempo-
ral framework that we operate with is the conventional clock and calendar system. 
However, the clock and calendar system is mastered relatively late in develop-
ment, meaning that in characterizing the acquisition of mature temporal cogni-
tion, we need to consider how children represent temporal locations before they 
master this system. Much existing developmental research on time has focused 
on children’s ability to process and represent duration information. In this paper, 
we will instead focus primarily on the development of the ability to locate events 
in time, and we make a preliminary attempt to provide a model of developmental 
changes in this ability. Before doing so, we briefly summarize some existing work 
on time in children.
1.1.  Time as a Dimension: Processing Duration
It is clear that children, from an early age, are sensitive to how long events last 
for. A series of innovative studies of timing in infancy have demonstrated infants’ 
sensitivity to the duration of events and the developmental continuity of the pro-
cesses involved in time perception (e.g., Brannon et al., 2004; Colombo & Rich-
man, 2002; VanMarle & Wynn, 2006). Moreover, research with older children, 
much of which has been conducted by Sylvie Droit-Volet, has carefully charted 
developmental improvements in sensitivity to duration and also identified some 
of the mechanisms that contribute to such improvements (see Droit-Volet, 2013, 
2016, for review). However, as Droit-Volet has also argued, being sensitive to the 
duration of events, which is present even in infancy, is not the same thing as 
understanding that events have particular durations (Droit-Volet & Rattat, 1999; 
Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2007). Sensitivity to durations can be manifested by chil-
dren adjusting their behavior appropriately to the durations of events that they 
perceive and process. However, children can adjust their behavior appropriately 
to event duration without an explicit grasp of the idea that events have durations. 
Thus, we can ask when children possess the concept of duration itself.
Historically, research on this issue was conducted within the Piagetian tradi-
tion (stemming from Piaget, 1969). Research in this tradition takes as its starting 
point the idea that having a notion of temporal duration is a matter of being able 
to coordinate the relations between the dimensions of time, speed, and distance 
in the movement of objects (what Piaget thought of as the Newtonian notion 
of time). Empirical work primarily focused on the nature of the errors children 
made in their duration judgments that suggested a conflation of these dimen-
sions. While this work undoubtedly highlighted some striking errors in chil-
dren’s timing judgments, this tradition has generated little research interest since 
the 1980s. This is largely because researchers have come to reject some of the 
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central tenets of this approach. Fully coordinating the dimensions of speed, dis-
tance, and time is a complex achievement, and even 8- to 12-year-olds can struggle 
to make accurate judgments of duration when these dimensions are confounded 
(Richards, 1982; Siegler & Richards, 1979). It has therefore been argued that there 
must be more basic aspects of the mature notion of time that this approach ne-
glects (Levin, 1982, 1992; Weist, 1989; Wilkening, 1982). Moreover, the idea that 
we can measure children’s notion of time primarily by looking at the accuracy of 
their duration judgments, as is assumed in the Piagetian approach, also faces the 
problem that even the duration judgments of adults can be affected by irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions (see Matthews & Meck, 2016, for a recent review), whilst, 
at the same time, even relatively young children can make some judgments of 
duration, arguably without relying on the sort of complex inferential processes 
highlighted within the Piagetian tradition (Droit-Volet, 2002, 2013; Droit-Volet & 
Coull, 2016).
Weist (1989) has spoken of a Piagetian void’ that this approach leaves, even set-
ting aside other problems it faces, because it has little to say about early childhood. 
It is this void that we hope to make some initial steps to fill, and we think the void 
is not just one regarding the early years, but also a void regarding central aspects 
of temporal cognition and their development. The Piagetian tradition focuses on 
time as a dimension of events — i.e., as lasting for a duration of a specific mag-
nitude — with this approach trying to identify when children can separate out 
this dimension from other stimulus dimensions. Although the Piagetian approach 
has largely been discarded, recent research has retained this focus on time as a 
dimension. For instance, a central question in recent research on temporal rep-
resentation has been whether children can make systematic mappings between 
temporal duration and other dimensions (Lourenco & Longo, 2010; Srinivasan & 
Carey, 2010). And, as mentioned above, most of the developmental research on 
time has continued to concentrate on changes in the accuracy with which chil-
dren make judgments about duration. While these issues are clearly fundamen-
tal ones, here we want to emphasize the other, equally important, way in which 
time features in cognition. As we have already pointed out, time is also used as a 
framework insofar as events are located within time (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999): 
adults think of events as positioned somewhere in the past, present, or future and 
also as having locations in time relative to each other, with there being systematic 
before-and-after relations between these locations. We take it to be a crucial, but 
underexplored, developmental question whether children operate with the same 
sort of temporal framework as adults, or whether there are more developmentally 
basic ways of representing the locations of events.
While we will be focusing on children’s temporal frameworks, we also acknowl-
edge that the question framed above and addressed by Piaget — i.e., when do 
children have a concept of duration — remains an important question. Moreover, 
introducing the issue of the acquisition of a mature temporal framework raises a 
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further question of how this developmental process is linked to the acquisition of 
a concept of duration. Are these separable developmental achievements, or are 
they linked in important ways? Part of the power of our conventional temporal 
framework, the clock and calendar system, is that it deals both with duration and 
with temporal location: e.g., days, weeks, and years last for a certain duration, but, 
by assigning a time and date to an event, its time of occurrence is also located 
relative to other times. Thus, mature temporal cognition integrates both these as-
pects of time. We will return to the issue of how this is achieved developmentally 
towards the end of the paper.
1.2.  What are the Properties of Mature Temporal Cognition?
There are some fundamental questions about the way children think about time 
that we do not as yet have the answers for. For example, we do not know whether 
in locating events in time, children make use of the basic distinction between 
past, present, and future that adults operate with. This lack of knowledge stems 
from both a methodological and a theoretical gap in the literature on cognitive 
development. With regard to methodology, unlike in some areas of developmental 
psychology, there is no agreed set of tasks that are used to tap children’s temporal 
concepts. This methodological gap stems at least in part from the theoretical gap: 
there is no agreed theoretical approach that actually specifies the core features of 
mature temporal understanding from which such tasks might be derived. For this 
reason, we start by outlining three core features of adults’ mature concept of time 
that will shape our discussion of the developmental issues.
(i) Time is represented as linear and unidirectional. A mature temporal frame-
work locates events on a time line stretching back into the past and forward into 
the future, with each location on the line being unique and non-reoccurring. This 
time line has a direction in so far as events successively become present in the 
future direction, as expressed in the idea of the ‘flow’ or ‘passage’ of time.
(ii) Time is unified. A single time line is used to represent temporal locations, 
and, as a result of this, every point in time stands in a systematic before/after rela-
tion to every other point in time. Transitivity holds between these relations: if a 
point in time A is before B and B is before C, then A is also before C.
(iii) Time is event independent. Although time is populated by events, adults 
are able to think of points in time independently of the particular events that 
occur at them. Being able to distinguish between a point in time and any events 
that might occur at that point is an important aspect of mature temporal cogni-
tion. This aspect of temporal cognition is most clearly embodied in the clock and 
calendar system, which can be used to specify any point in time without making 
reference to any events that have occurred or might occur at that temporal loca-
tion. However, we are not claiming that children only have this way of thinking 
about time once they have mastered the clock and calendar system. Rather this 
way of thinking about time is likely to be a developmental prerequisite to being 
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able to begin to learn such a system, and may be intact long before children master 
it (which they only do relatively late in development).
Note that our aim here is to characterize features of everyday thinking about 
time. Science, e.g., in the form of the theory of relativity, provides a somewhat 
more complex picture of the nature of reality itself, which reveals some of the 
assumptions listed above to be in need of qualification. Similarly, some philoso-
phers working on the metaphysics of time question the extent to which some of 
the assumptions we have listed correctly reflect the nature of time itself, or are 
ultimately illusory. (On both of these issues, see, e.g., Dainton, 2010.) However, 
we take it as fairly uncontroversial that the descriptions given above capture three 
core features of the way in which we do in fact think of or speak about time in 
ordinary, everyday contexts. The purpose of specifying these core features is to 
provide a template against which to compare children’s ways of thinking about 
and representing time: we can ask at what point in development children pos-
sess a notion of time that has these features, and raise the possibility that early in 
development the way in which children represent time may lack one or more of 
them. That is, it is possible that young children do not think of time as linear and 
unidirectional, do not have a unified way of representing the temporal locations 
of events, and cannot think of time in an event-independent way.
1.3.  Temporal Perspective-Taking: A Hallmark of Mature Temporal Cognition
Before describing our developmental model, we want to further elaborate the 
properties of the type of mature temporal cognition that we take to be the end-
point of development. In the previous section, we outlined the features of the 
notion of time that we wish to focus on. Here, we want to stress that a hallmark of 
possessing such a notion is the ability to engage in what can be termed temporal 
perspective taking, an ability that we will now describe.
Part of what it is to possess a linear and unidirectional notion of time is to un-
derstand that what points in time are in the past, present, and future is not fixed. 
Rather, it changes systematically as time goes on. That is, for any ordered set of 
times A, B, and C that have now passed, there was a point in time at which what 
was to happen at A, B, and C was still in the future. Similarly, from the perspective 
in time at which A has just passed, A is in the past, whereas B and C are still in the 
future and so on. One way to describe this is to say that a mature notion of time 
supports a type of temporal perspective-taking that allows one to consider which 
times are in the past and which in the future from points in time other than the 
point one currently occupies (e.g., from the temporal perspective of yesterday, to-
day was still in the future, but today will be in the past from the temporal perspec-
tive of tomorrow).
The idea that temporal perspective-taking is a hallmark of a mature notion of 
time is not new, and has been put forward by other theorists (Cromer, 1971; Harn-
er, 1982; Weist, 1989; see also McCormack, 2014; McCormack & Hoerl, 1999), but 
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we want to emphasize here a particularly crucial aspect of temporal perspective- 
taking, namely that because time is understood as unidirectional, temporal 
perspective-taking must be grounded in a grasp of the asymmetry between past 
and future times. In people’s everyday understanding of time, there is a basic 
asymmetry between the past and the future: thinking about times as being ‘in the 
past’ involves thinking of them in a quite different way than thinking about them 
as being ‘in the future’ does. One way to capture this asymmetry in the everyday 
understanding of time is in terms of the idea that facts about what happened in 
the past are not alterable, whereas facts about what will happen in the future are 
at least potentially alterable.1 We argue that mature temporal perspective-taking 
must involve putting to work this idea, and it is only because it has this element 
that it embodies a grasp of the unique directionality of time.
To make this clear, it is worth considering what is distinctive about temporal 
perspective-taking that makes it a quite different sort of cognitive achievement 
from spatial perspective-taking. In spatial perspective-taking, one may have to 
grasp that, for example, from this perspective in space the table is in front and the 
chair is behind one, whereas from another perspective both of these are behind 
one. In doing so, of course, one must be able to distinguish in some way between 
‘in front’ and ‘behind’. However, although whether something is in front of or be-
hind one has implications for one’s actions, there is nothing inherently different 
about the nature of those actual locations in space and indeed one could change 
whether something is in front of or behind one freely by moving to a different 
place. The temporal case is quite different. Whether something is in the past or in 
the future is not something that is in our power to determine, and which of two 
temporal locations is in the past and which is in the future is not something that 
can be reversed: we might say that in the everyday understanding of time there is 
something ontologically different about locations in the past and the future. Our 
suggestion is that temporal perspective-taking underpinned by a mature grasp of 
time must involve understanding this, which is why we describe it as perspective-
taking that involves putting to work the idea that facts about what happened in 
the past are unalterable whereas facts about what will happen in the future are 
still potentially alterable. An important developmental question, therefore, is 
when children can engage in this sort of perspective-taking.
1 We will be using this way of talking to characterize the kind of idea of the future as ‘open’ ex-
pressed in sentences like: “I was going to go to the cinema this evening, but now I think I might 
stay at home.” Again, note that this is meant to capture an aspect of our everyday thinking about 
time and events in time. Whether the future is genuinely different from the past in reality is a 
question on which there is a great deal of debate in philosophy, because it is of course equally as 
true of future times as of past ones that they can only ever contain one of these types of event or 
the other. (I either will go to the cinema, or I will stay at home).
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We will finish this sub-section by making it clear exactly why we think this sort 
of temporal perspective-taking involves event-independent thought about time. 
Consider the case again of an ordered series of times A, B, and C that are now 
in the past. Someone capable of temporal perspective-taking understands that 
from the perspective of A, facts about events at B and C, which have now already 
taken place, were in fact still potentially alterable. Grasping this means that they 
understand that, from that perspective, it was still possible for things to unfold 
differently to how they actually did unfold. That is, they understand that B and C 
are slots in time that could have been filled with different events than the events 
that actually did happen. Grasping this means thinking about B and C in an event- 
independent way: as times that are separable from the events that actually did 
happen. Note that in spelling things out in this way, we are making a strong con-
nection between being able to think counterfactually and a mature notion of time. 
Moreover, someone who can think in this way can also understand that there may 
be events that happened at A that have left no observable traces in the present, 
sometimes taken to be crucial element of a proper understanding what it is for an 
event to be in the past (Hoerl, 2007). This is because they understand that while 
what happened at A may have left its traces on how things were at a subsequent 
time B, facts about what would happen subsequent to B were still alterable when 
B was present, so that things happening at or after B may have removed any such 
traces again.
1.4.  Culture and Notions of Time
In proposing a developmental model of the acquisition of a notion of time that 
has the features we have emphasized, we need to briefly consider to what extent 
such a model is likely to capture something universal, rather than culture-specific. 
That is to say, are there cultures in which the features of mature temporal cogni-
tion that we have outlined are not in fact found? Probably the key controversial is-
sue here is whether all cultures operate with a linear notion of time. We note that 
a linear notion of time, according to which temporal locations are represented as 
unique and non-recurring, could be instantiated in a number of different ways in 
the spatialized representations of time that are often referred to as ‘mental time 
lines’ (Bender & Beller, 2014). In a number of cultures, including English-speaking 
Western cultures, time lines seem to have particular axes: time is spatialized either 
on the sagittal axis, with the past behind and the future in front relative to the 
body, or the transversal axis with the past to the left and future to the right. As is 
now well-established, other cultures spatialize times in different ways. In some 
instances, this involves a reversal of the assignment of past/future to portions of 
the sagittal or transversal axes (Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Núñez & Sweetser, 
2006) but it may involve use of a different axis or another spatial framework: Man-
darin speakers make use of a vertical axis (Boroditsky et al., 2011), and Boroditsky 
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and Gaby (2010) describe an Aboriginal tribe that represent time as running East 
to West.
Despite these cross-cultural differences, all of these ways of spatializing time 
can be interpreted just as different ways of spatially instantiating a linear notion 
of time; what varies is the nature of the instantiation or in some instances the type 
of spatial metaphor used (e.g., the course of a river or the inclination of a land-
scape; see Bender & Beller, 2014). The trickier question is whether there are any 
cultures in which the notion of linearity itself is entirely absent. That is, are there 
any cultures in which people do not think of times as unique and non-recurrent? A 
culture that represented times only in a cyclical or repeating temporal framework 
would be of this sort. While some existing or past cultures clearly do/did empha-
size cyclical or repeating patterns in time more than others (Aveni, 2000; Le Guen 
et al., 2012; Sinha & Gärdenfors, 2014), what is highly controversial is whether 
this is/was the only notion of time available to them (Gell, 1992; Hassig, 2001). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to properly address this question, though we 
note that looking at the characteristics of culturally specific spatial metaphors of 
time or calendar systems is not the only way to examine this issue. For example, 
Campbell (1997) has argued that a notion of time as linear is typically employed 
in constructing autobiographical narratives to describe events in one’s life (see 
also Hoerl & McCormack, 2005); if he is correct, then it seems unlikely that there 
is a culture that entirely lacks this mode of thinking about time (see McCormack, 
2015, for further discussion,).
2.  A Developmental Model of the Acquisition of Temporal Concepts
In this section, we propose a model of children’s acquisition of the notion of time 
we have described in Section 1.2, i.e., the notion of time that underpins the tem-
poral framework used by adults to locate events. This model does not address all 
aspects of the acquisition of temporal concepts; most notably it does not consider 
the acquisition of a concept of duration. The developmental endpoint that the 
model aims to capture is the notion of time that has the properties described in 
the previous subsection. Thus, the model holds that more developmentally primi-
tive ways of thinking about time lack some of the core features of mature tempo-
ral cognition we have outlined, and that younger children are not capable of the 
type of temporal perspective-taking described in Section 1.3.
One difficulty in proposing any comprehensive developmental model in this 
area is the lack of data from studies that have directly addressed key issues about 
children’s notion of time. In putting together our model, we have drawn on ex-
isting data from a variety of sources, including research on developmental psy-
cholinguistics, studies of children’s memory, planning, and future thinking, and 
experiments specifically addressing particular aspects of children’s reasoning 
about time and about causation. It should be emphasized that we have used the 
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principle of assuming only the minimal level of understanding necessary to ex-
plain what is currently known about children’s cognition at a specific age; this 
model is thus conservative in what abilities it ascribes to young children, and per-
haps may prove to be unnecessarily conservative. Moreover, we recognize that 
there is still a large empirical gap to be filled; the account we provide is speculative 
and can only act as a springboard for further research in this area.
Figure 1 shows diagrammatically the different developmental stages that we 
are proposing. The figure shows how children represent events or times that (ob-
jectively) are in the past and the future at each of four stages. Before describing 
Yet to come Completed
Current location
in time 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
e1
e2e3
e4
e5
e6
Not alterable Alterable
a)
b)
c)
d)
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Past Future
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Past Future
Representations of 
repeated event 
sequences
(< 24 months)
Event-based time
(2–3 years)
Linear event-
independent time
(4–5 years)
Abstract time
(> 5 years)
Figure 1. Summary of the developmental model. At Stage (a), representations are of repeated event 
sequences (as indicated by the circle) and time is not linear. At Stage (b), representations are still 
of events rather than of times per se, and there is no linear organization. At Stage (c), times are 
represented and organized linearly underpinned by an understanding of how causation operates in 
time. At Stage (d), time is represented in a fully abstract and event-independent way.
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each stage in detail, some general points can be made about the developmental 
shifts that the model tries to capture. First, children are assumed to shift from only 
being able to represent events [Stages (a) and (b)] to being able to represent points 
in time [Stages (c) and (d)]. That is, we are assuming that there is a shift from 
event-dependent to event-independent thought about time; our suggestion is also 
that whether thought about time is event-independent is a matter of degree and 
that the model documents a series of changes towards fully event-independent 
thought about time. Second, it is only Stages (c) and (d) that children are assumed 
to be able to think about the past and the future per se; at the early stages children 
treat past events differently compared to those in the future, but are not thinking 
of these events as located in a different time period, conceived of as such. Third, 
in Stages (a) and (b), time is not represented linearly and it is not assumed that 
children grasp the transitivity of the before-and-after relations between events. 
Thus, at the early stages of development, children’s notions of time lack the core 
features that we have emphasized as characteristic of mature temporal concepts.
This model is intended to capture key changes in the way children think about 
time that affect how they temporally locate events. Broadly speaking, children 
change from only being able to represent where in time an event is in terms of 
its position within an ordered repeated sequence of familiar events, to being able 
to assign events unique locations in time, and being able to think about whether 
those locations are currently in the past, present, or future. This emerging under-
standing then allows children to begin to acquire the conventional clock and cal-
endar system. The first stage of our model begins when children are toddlers, start-
ing to demonstrate in their actions that they are representing certain behavioral 
routines, and beginning to acquire language. Note that we do not discuss here how 
younger infants temporally locate events. Very young infants are sensitive to some 
temporal features of stimuli such as duration and rhythm, and this extends even 
to neonates (de Hevia et al., 2014; Nazzi et al., 1998), but it is extremely difficult 
to examine how they locate events in time.
2.1.  Stage (a): Representations of Repeated Event Sequences (18–24 months)
A basic distinction that can be made between different types of ways of being 
oriented in time is in terms of whether they involve representations of repeatedly 
occurring cycles/sequences of events or representations of particular unique 
times (Campbell, 1995). Recurring event cycles or event sequences of various 
lengths are ubiquitous in everyday life, and there are reliable temporal relations 
between locations in such event cycles/sequences. For example, brushing of teeth 
happens after supper but before bedtime in the evening routine, Tuesday happens 
before Wednesday but after Monday in the weekly cycle of days, and summer hap-
pens after spring but before winter in the annual cycle. Recognizing where events 
happen within such repeated cycles or event sequences is very important, because 
it allows actions (e.g., the bedtime routine) to be carried out in the appropriate 
 T. McCormack, C. Hoerl / Timing & Time Perception 5 (2017) 297–327 307
order and supports reliable prediction of what is going to happen next. Notably, 
though, mature thinkers can not only represent locations within such repeating 
event cycles/sequences in the right order, they can also think of any given occur-
rence of an event within a particular cycle or sequence as having a unique tempo-
ral location. To give two examples, although the action sequence in the bedtime 
routine is the same every day, today’s tooth brushing occurs at a particular time 
that is never revisited; similarly, Tuesday always comes before Wednesday but 
Tuesday 23rd August 2016 is also a unique point in time and in that respect differs 
from every other Tuesday. Mature thinkers can represent both these unique tem-
poral locations alongside understanding where in repeated event cycle/sequence 
that type of event happens with respect to other events in the cycle/sequence.
An assumption underpinning our model is that representing locations within 
repeated event cycles/sequences is more primitive than representing particular 
times. In fact, we believe that it is more primitive both ontogenetically and phy-
logenetically; specifically, we have argued elsewhere that there is no reason to as-
sume that animals can think about particular times (Hoerl, 2008; McCormack, 
2001; McCormack & Hoerl, 2011; see also Campbell, 1995). Part of this argument 
hinges on what the function is of representing temporal locations as particular 
times; for many types of behavior what matters is knowing the appropriate order 
in which to carry out an action sequence, and knowing what to expect at any given 
point in a repeated event cycle/sequence. In fact, it is by no means straightforward 
to identify non-linguistic behavior that depends upon on a concept of times as 
unique and unrepeatable (Bennett, 1989; Campbell, 1995, 2006; McCormack & 
Hoerl, 2011).
It is evident from relatively early in development that children are adept at 
learning repeated event sequences (reviewed by Nelson, 1996). Toddlers rapidly 
acquire behavioral expectations regarding repeated sequences (e.g., expecting to 
have a bath before sleep time), and parents typically try to shape toddlers’ behav-
ior so that they will learn to carry out some action sequences in the appropriate 
order (e.g., we put on our socks before our shoes). In our model, we characterize 
this sensitivity as Stage (a), with the oval around the events intended to indicate 
the repeating nature of the sequences, thus represented, in contrast to the way 
mature thinkers represent events as happening at unique, non-reoccurring loca-
tions on a time line.
There are three important things to stress about the limitations we assume at 
this stage. First, we see no reason to posit that very young children who can rep-
resent locations with respect to repeated event sequences can think about those 
locations in an event independent way. For example, with respect to the bedtime 
routine, although there is a sense in which children know ‘when’ their bath hap-
pens (after supper and before bed), there is nothing about this that compels us to 
assume that they can think about that temporal location as anything other than 
the point at which bath time happens. In this sense, very young children need not 
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be thinking about times per se, but rather their thought is restricted to events that 
fill time. It is in this strong sense that we assume that earliest notions of time are 
event-dependent. Second, if all that very young children are able to do is represent 
and orient themselves within repeated event sequences, there is no reason to be-
lieve that they can think about events as located in the past or in the future. A key 
part of what it is to represent an event as in the past is to represent it as happen-
ing at a particular time that can never be revisited. By definition, if children can 
only represent repeated event sequences, they will not be able to represent events 
as having happened at a time that can never be revisited. They will have no way 
of thinking of yesterday’s bath time as different from today’s or tomorrow’s bath 
time: in all these instances, bath time is represented just in terms of where it falls 
relative to other events in the bedtime event sequence.
Although we believe this is the case, it should be stressed that in order for chil-
dren to make use of representations of repeated event sequences, they need to be 
able to know where they are within an unfolding sequence. That is, they need to 
be able to use their representation to orient themselves in some way so that they 
have expectations about what will happen next (e.g., putting on of pyjamas hap-
pens next), and can assume that events that have already happened are now over 
(e.g., once pyjamas are on, it would be very surprising to be given a bath). One 
way of capturing this is by saying that, at this stage, children need to be capable of 
representing some events as ‘completed’ and some events as ‘yet to come’. Impor-
tantly, though, orienting themselves with respect to events in this way is not the 
same thing as thinking of events as being located in a past or future time period: in 
thinking in this way, children are thinking about the status of events (completed/
not completed) rather than the location of points in time (past/future).
Finally, it should be pointed out that if children orient themselves only with 
respect to repeated event sequences, there is no reason to assume that they have 
what we have termed a unified way of representing time. That is, they have no 
single way of representing any given location in time. For example, they may be 
sensitive to the fact that having a bath happens before going to bed, or that they get 
into the car before arriving at nursery, but may have no way of thinking about how 
the daily event of getting into the car is related to the event of having a bath. Thus, 
although Fig. 1a shows an ordered sequence of events, this should be interpreted 
as representing a single type of event sequence; there is no reason to assume that 
very young children can systematically relate ordered sequences to each other.
We speculate that Stage (a) describes children’s temporal representations for 
approximately the first 18–24 months of life. It should be noted, though, that to-
ward the end of this period some children begin to use the past tense for the first 
time (for examples, see Shirai & Andersen, 1995; Shirai & Miyata, 2006; Weist, 
1989). The issue then, is how we should interpret early use of the past tense, and 
whether this early use suggests that very young children do not have the concep-
tual limitations that we are proposing here. Historically, this has been a highly 
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controversial issue (Antinucci & Miller, 1976; Bronckart & Sinclair, 1973; Weist, 
1989, 2014), and it is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize the develop-
mental psycholinguistics debate. Detailed analyses suggest that children’s first uses 
of the past tense (Sachs, 1983; Shirai & Miyata, 2006) are to the immediate rather 
than the remote past, consistent with the idea that very young children’s first use of 
the past tense is to mark something about the nature of the events themselves (i.e., 
that they are completed).2 In suggesting this, we are not claiming that these very 
young children cannot represent anything except the here-and-now. We are as-
suming that young children have the sort of representational capacities widely at-
tributed to them in the post-Piagetian era of cognitive developmental psychology, 
as demonstrated, e.g., by studies of deferred imitation of event sequences (Bauer 
& Wewerka, 1995; Bauer et al., 1994; Meltzoff, 1995) or by the fact that children 
of this age will refer to absent objects or people (Sachs, 1983). These capacities, 
though, do not demonstrate that they can think of events as being non-current, 
but located at another time, in the past.
2.2.  Stage (b): Event-Based Time (2–3 years)
At this next stage, we assume that children can do more than simply represent 
locations with respect to repeated event sequences. Between two and three years 
of age, children typically use both past and future tense and start to use temporal 
adverbs to make reference to temporally distant events. Studies of children’s au-
tobiographical memory consistently suggest that children of this age can provide 
at least some details of remote past events, and can use the past tense to do so 
(e.g., Peterson, 2002; Peterson & Rideout, 1998; Weist & Zevenbergen, 2008). By 
the time children are three, they can provide (albeit often sparse) information 
about events due to occur at some point in the future using the appropriate tense 
(e.g., Hayne et al., 2011; Quon & Atance, 2010). Even if children’s descriptions of 
past and future events are often both highly scaffolded by adults’ questioning and 
piecemeal in nature (Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Nelson & Fivush, 2004), these find-
ings suggest that children in this age range can do more than simply think about 
the locations of events in repeated event sequences, meaning that their temporal 
cognition differs fundamentally from that of younger children.
However, we believe that there may still be important limitations in children’s 
grasp of temporal concepts at this stage. As can be seen in Fig.  1b, our sugges-
tion is that children of this age may still be thinking about events rather than 
points in time even when considering things that have happened outside the 
immediate past or present. Moreover, we have characterized them as not having 
2 Note that we are not suggesting here that very young children only use the past tense for actions 
that have a natural end-point or point of achievement. Actions that are not of this nature can still 
be thought of as completed.
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a linear notion of time that would allow them to systematically represent the 
before-and-after relations between events. And because children are assumed not 
to be representing the same domain of times as mature thinkers, we do not as-
sume that they have full-blown concepts of the past and future either. Children 
of this age use tense appropriately, indicating that they draw an important dis-
tinction between two categories of events. However, what is at issue is whether 
these two categories map on to the notions of past and future, as they are usually 
understood. In our model, we suggest that although children of this age draw a 
clear distinction between past and future events, it need only be assumed that 
they think of these events as having different statuses, rather than occurring on 
different parts of a time line that centres on the present. It is because of this that 
we still consider thought about time to be event-dependent at this age.
We pointed out in Section 1.3 that in adults’ everyday understanding of time, 
there is an asymmetry between the past and the future, and that part of this asym-
metry is that things in the past are unalterable, whereas things in the future are 
yet to be decided. Our suggestion is that children’s earliest grasp of the difference 
between the past and future may consist primarily in them categorizing past and 
future events differently, i.e., they think of facts about past events as unalterable 
and facts about future events as (at least potentially) alterable, and it is this sense 
that the events fall into two different categories. Using these two categories appro-
priately is very important — for example, so as not to miss out on the opportunity 
to change things that still can be changed by dwelling too much on things that can 
no longer be changed — but in itself falls short of fully grasping the distinction 
between past and future times. The suggestion is that children may operate with 
this categorical distinction between events without having a linear, unified, event-
independent notion of time.
In suggesting these limitations in two- to three-year-olds’ notion of time, one 
key consideration is whether children have any grasp of how temporally distant 
events are related to each other. What is undoubtedly true is that children of this 
age can sometimes provide temporally ordered descriptions of an event sequence 
that has occurred in the past. For example, Nelson (1996) provides the narrative 
of two-year-old Emily who describes a past event as follows “My sleep. Mommy 
came. And Mommy ‘get up get up time go home.’ When my slep [sic]… Time to go 
home. Drink p-water [Perrier]. Yesterday did that. Now Emmy sleeping in regular 
bed”; for other examples from Emily, see Gerhardt (1989). Emily seems to have a 
temporally structured representation for an event sequence that happened pre-
viously, so she knows when individual components of that event sequence hap-
pened relative to each other. However, as discussed above, a mature linear and 
unified notion of time allows for more than this: it is underpinned by a grasp of 
the fact that systematic relations exist between any two points in time, even be-
tween entirely unrelated events. As mentioned above, these systematic relations 
have an important property, namely that of transitivity. What we are suggesting 
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is that there is currently no convincing evidence that two- to three-year-olds can 
think about temporal relations in this way.
One challenge to how we have characterized the temporal abilities of children 
of this age, particularly in terms of assuming that they can only think of time in 
an event-dependent way, might be thought to come from psycholinguistic stud-
ies. Children aged two to three years learn to use temporal adverbs, such as ‘now’, 
‘already’, ‘later’, ‘when’, and ‘soon’ (Weist, 2014; Weist & Buczowska 1987; Weist & 
Zevenbergen, 2008). They will also use terms such as ‘yesterday’ and ‘tomorrow’ 
(Pawlak et al., 2006; Weist & Buczowska 1987), although not necessarily accu-
rately. One important issue is whether this indicates that children are using these 
terms to single out points in time per se, rather than events. If they were, this 
would suggest that they are not event-dependent in their temporal thinking in the 
way that we have argued. One way to put this point would be to say that children 
using these terms may be introducing a temporal context in which to describe 
events, and, thus, that they are not simply describing the events themselves.
While we agree that the use of these types of terms signals that children’s abili-
ties go well beyond those captured in Stage (a), we believe that it does not tell us 
whether children are actually picking out an event-independent point in time. 
That is, what these adverbs mean for children when they first start using them 
might potentially actually be cashed out purely with reference to events them-
selves, rather than with reference to times as such. So, for example, ‘later’ could po-
tentially mean ‘once certain events have finished’, and ‘when’ might always mean 
‘simultaneous with a certain event’ rather than ‘at the point in time at which’, and 
so on. In other words, children may be introducing an event context rather than a 
temporal context. Nelson (1996) argues for this sort of interpretation of early use 
of temporal adverbs stating that “the child uses knowledge of event structure as a 
framework for acquiring and eventually interpreting words coding temporal rela-
tions…” (p. 286). Here, what she means is that children learn to use these words 
in the context of their event representations, and it is only later that the terms 
acquire their full meaning. She suggests that even terms such as ‘yesterday’ or ‘to-
morrow’ might initially only be understood in relation to certain events, rather 
than understood as referring to periods of time in the past and future.
Children’s limitations also become clearer by considering that there is no evi-
dence that children of this age are capable of the sort of temporal perspective-
taking that we described in detail in Section  1.3. That is, children may indeed 
categorize some facts about events as unalterable and some as (at least poten-
tially) alterable [Stage (b)], but may not yet be capable of the sort of temporal 
perspective-taking that a mature notion of time allows. As far as we are aware, 
there is no evidence to suggest that children of this age can appreciate that the 
status of events as unalterable or alterable changes systematically as time passes, 
and that at different points in time facts about events that were once alterable 
became no longer so. That is, we do not believe that children of this age are 
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capable of the sort of flexible thinking about time that is underpinned by a linear 
and unidirectional notion of time. We argued in Section 1.3 that such an ability 
is a hallmark of a mature notion of time, not only because it involves represent-
ing the domain of times as linear and unidirectional, but because it involves rep-
resenting times in an event-independent way. Thinking of a past event as ‘once 
potentially alterable’ involves a grasp of the fact that the time the event occurred 
could have been filled with different possible events; i.e., it involves being able to 
think about points of time independently of the events that occupy those points 
in time. Although children of this age are able to talk about some events in the 
past and future, can use tensed forms appropriately, and use some temporal ad-
verbs, we would argue that this is not sufficient evidence of the understanding we 
have described.
2.3.  Stage (c): Linear Event-Independent Time (4–5 years)
In our model, we are suggesting that sometime around four to five years, there 
is an important shift in how children can think about time, when children start 
to represent time in a linear and unified way, and become capable of event- 
independent thought about times. Children now grasp that there are systematic 
relations between points in time and realize that as time unfolds things due to 
happen in the future will become present and then move to the past.
One good reason for assuming that children of this age start to grasp the rela-
tions between times comes from studies that ask children about the temporal rela-
tions between different events that happened at quite distinct points in time and 
were not part of a connected sequence. For example, Friedman (1991) showed 
that four-year-olds can judge the relative order of two unrelated events that oc-
curred in their schools six weeks apart (a lesson on tooth brushing and a demo of 
how video cameras work). A number of other studies have also shown that four- 
and five-year-olds make some judgments about the order of unrelated events over 
extended time periods (Friedman, 2000; Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Friedman et al., 
1995; Hudson & Mayhew, 2011; McCormack & Hanley, 2011), although children 
find it easier to order past than future events (Busby-Grant & Suddendorf, 2009; 
McCormack & Hanley, 2011). Some of these studies used a time line procedure 
whereby children had to place events at locations on a line stretching back into 
the past or forward into the future, and although children of this age are not per-
fect at this task, their above-chance performance suggests that they understood 
this format (Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Hudson & Mayhew, 2011; though see Droit-
Volet & Coull, 2015).
A recent study by Tillman and colleagues (2017) provided the most extensive 
study to date of children’s ability to use such a time line. In their study, children 
were shown a horizontal line, with a vertical line in the middle that marked ‘right 
now’, and were asked to mark in the locations of some past (e.g., eating breakfast 
that morning) and future events (their next birthday), as well as some locations 
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corresponding to deictic time words (such as yesterday or next week). By four to 
five years, but not before, children were able to appropriately place locations in 
the side of the time line representing the past versus the future, and they also were 
above chance in ordering the locations appropriately on the time line (e.g., that 
‘yesterday’ is before ‘this morning’). Notably, the ability to appropriately locate 
times in the past versus the future was closely linked to the ability to order loca-
tions in time, suggesting that children of this age have developed a coherent linear 
and unidirectional representation of the domain of time that underpinned both 
abilities. In summary, findings from a number of different studies including the 
recent one by Tillman et al. (2017) indicate that, at this age, children understand 
something important about the relations between points in time.
We have also suggested that event-independent thought about time might be 
closely linked to counterfactual thought, because thinking counterfactually about 
a past event indicates that children understand that there is a distinction between 
the point in time at which an event occurred and the event itself (i.e., something 
different could have happened, because the point in time at which the event oc-
curred was once in the future and hence still potentially alterable). In fact, there is 
considerable disagreement amongst cognitive developmental psychologists over 
when children can think counterfactually (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Rafetseder & Per-
ner, 2014). Much of this debate hinges on whether children may be able to answer 
some types of counterfactual questions without actually engaging in counterfac-
tual thought (Beck, 2016; Rafetseder et al., 2010, 2013).
Beck et al.’s (2006) study examined children’s ability to think about both future 
possibility and counterfactual possibility in a novel way. In their task, children 
watched as a toy mouse was dropped down into a chute that branched off into two 
sides. Beck et al. asked children a specific type of counterfactual question: children 
were asked, after the mouse had fallen down one branch of the chute, whether it 
could have gone anywhere else (a so-called open counterfactual question). Three- 
to four-year-olds had difficulties answering this question, but five- to six-year-olds 
were able to do so. Beck et al. (p. 424) suggest that answering correctly requires 
that “one appreciates that there was a point in time when either the actual or 
counterfactual event could have happened”. Furthermore, in order to assess the 
idea that children would consider that different possible outcomes could occur 
in the future, before dropping the mouse they asked children to put cotton wool 
mats out to catch it. Children could either put out a single mat or two mats, one 
for each branch of the chute. Beck et al. argued that if children understood that 
there could be more than one possible outcome, they should put out mats under 
both branches. Three- and four-year-olds typically put out only a single mat, and 
it was not until children were around five years old that they were likely to put out 
two mats. Given the findings of both these tasks, Beck et al. conclude that it is not 
until around five years that children can think both about the future and about 
the present as locations in time at which multiple possible events could occur 
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or have occurred. These findings are consistent with the sort of shift in children’s 
understanding of time that we have outlined here.
Being able to think about time in an event-independent way is also important 
for everyday activities such as some types of planning. Typically, when one is plan-
ning, one thinks about not just which actions one might engage in, but also the or-
der in which one should engage in them. One may mentally shuffle these actions 
about or replace them with other actions in order to try to figure out what the 
optimal sequence would be. Thus, just as planning a spatial layout may involve an 
object-independent way of thinking about space — e.g., mentally moving furni-
ture around so that the table goes there and the lamp goes here — so planning may 
typically involve an event-independent way of thinking about time in which one 
mentally moves around events to figure out how to obtain the outcome one wants. 
In their review paper of the research on young children’s planning, McCormack 
and Atance (2011) have argued that there are distinctive developmental changes 
in children’s ability to plan for the future that occur around four to five years. In 
particular, children start to be able to plan on a variety of different tasks that have 
in common the requirement to be able to flexibly reason about the temporal rela-
tions between steps in a sequence of actions, mentally trying out different pos-
sible actions at different steps (e.g., Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989; Kaller et al., 2008; 
McColgan & McCormack, 2008).
Some of these studies can also be interpreted as involving temporal 
perspective-taking. For example, in McColgan and McCormack’s (2008) study, 
children were told about a character who was visiting a zoo, and wanted to take 
a picture of a kangaroo. Children had to choose where to leave the character’s 
camera so that she could ensure that she had the camera by the time she got to 
the kangaroo’s cage. Some of the locations were on the path before the kangaroo’s 
cage, and some after. One way of characterizing what children have to do in this 
task is that they have to realize that by the time the character reaches the cage, the 
event of picking up the camera, which is now in the future, must be in the past, 
i.e., they have to be able to reason appropriately about before-and-after relations 
between points in time and engage in temporal perspective-taking.
We want to emphasize here that this requires an understanding of how causal-
ity operates in time. Mature thinkers understand that the passage of time leads 
to the unfolding of causally linked states of affairs: in terms of an ordered set of 
points of time in the past A, B, and C, they can think of the events at A as caus-
ally determining a certain outcome at B, and events at B as potentially changing 
that outcome, leading to a different outcome at C, and they grasp that these caus-
al relations are not reversible. Elsewhere we have termed this sort of reasoning 
that involves appreciating the causal significance of temporal order as temporal- 
causal reasoning (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hoerl 2005, 
2007). Note that being able to engage in this form of reasoning goes beyond be-
ing able to produce a sequence of causally linked actions to achieve a goal, which 
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children can do from an early age. Rather, it requires a reflective ability to reason 
about temporal-causal relations themselves.
Some studies have directly looked at young children’s ability to engage in this 
sort of reasoning about causality in time, and the general conclusion is that this 
ability emerges somewhere around four to five years. In examining this ability, it 
is crucial to distinguish between judgments that involve simply updating one’s 
model of the world sequentially as states of affairs unfold, and actually reason-
ing about causal relations in time. Updating can allow one to have a model of the 
world that is sensitive to how the unfolding of a sequence of events has impacted 
on how things are: it is simply a matter of changing one’s representations of how 
things are systematically as one sequentially acquires pieces of information about 
states of the world. For example, if a sequence of events A, B, and C occurs, up-
dating simply involves changing one’s representation of how things are initially 
following A, then following B, and then following C. This does not involve rea-
soning about event order per se. Temporal-causal reasoning is more sophisticated 
than this, because it involves actually reasoning about how the sequence in which 
events happened has yielded one outcome rather than another: for example, rea-
soning that if A happened and then B, this would have led to outcome X but if B 
happened and then A, this would have led to outcome Y. Distinguishing between 
simple updating and temporal-causal reasoning is not straightforward: it involves 
decoupling the order in which children find out about events from the order in 
which the events actually happen, because if children find out about events in the 
same order in which they actually happen they could well use updating to cor-
rectly judge the current state of the world.
The first study to use this approach was that of Povinelli and colleagues (1999). 
These authors showed children two video clips of a toy being hidden in a box be-
hind their back while they had been playing a game (i.e., children had not seen the 
hiding events when they occurred). In each video, the child was playing a different 
game, and the toy was being hidden in a different one of two boxes. The children 
were shown the two videos together, after they had played both games, but cru-
cially some children were shown the clips in a different temporal order from the 
one in which the two filmed episodes had actually occurred. Thus, those children 
had to use their knowledge of the order in which they had played the two games 
to reason that the toy was now in the location shown in the first video they saw 
rather than in the second video. It was not until children were five that they were 
able to do this.
Two subsequent studies by McCormack and Hoerl (2005, 2007) also decoupled 
the order in which children found out about events from actual event order, but 
did not use a video clip method. In one study (McCormack & Hoerl, 2007), chil-
dren were told that two boy dolls always acted in a specific order. The boys then 
went into a room in a dolls’ house that had a red cupboard and a blue cupboard 
and the door was closed so that children could not see the subsequent events. 
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The experimenter narrated to children what was happening, which was that the 
doll who always went first put a hairbrush in one cupboard (without naming the 
color), and the other doll got the hairbrush out and put it in a different cupboard. 
The door to the room was then opened, and the dolls were standing beside the 
cupboards that they had put the hairbrush in. Children had to use their knowledge 
about the order in which the dolls acted in order to figure out where the hairbrush 
was. As in Povinelli et al.’s (1997) study, it was not until children were around five 
years that they could do this. Using a different procedure, McCormack and Hoerl 
(2005) found a similar pattern of age effects.
Interestingly, another context in which the order in which children find out 
about events differs from actual event order is in the context of some types of 
sentence constructions involving the terms ‘before’ and ‘after’. These terms allow 
the speaker to decouple order in exactly this way: for example, in the sentence 
‘Before the girl took off her hat, she took off her coat.’, the taking off of the hat hap-
pens after the taking off of the coat but is mentioned first. A number of studies 
have suggested that three- to four-year-olds tend to use an order-of-mention strat-
egy to understand sentences involving ‘before’ and ‘after’, meaning that they will 
typically have difficulty with sentences in which order of mention does not match 
event order (Blything et al., 2015; French & Brown, 1977; McCormack & Hanley, 
2011; Trosborg, 1982). One possibility is that children’s ability to understand such 
non-chronological sentences is primarily constrained by their working memory 
skills (Blything et al., 2015), because of the need to mentally manipulate the sen-
tence content. Alternatively, it could be that young children’s comprehension dif-
ficulties are part of a larger problem in reasoning about event order. One piece of 
evidence in favor of the latter possibility is that children’s comprehension on such 
non-chronological sentences is correlated with performance on tasks that involve 
making judgments or reasoning about event order (McCormack & Hanley, 2011).
Taken together, these findings suggest that at around four to five years chil-
dren are able to reason in a new way about how causality operates in time. How-
ever, there are only a limited number of studies that have looked at this issue and, 
moreover, they have all looked at children’s reasoning about just two events that 
occurred over a relatively short time scale of a few seconds to minutes. We be-
lieve there is considerable scope to look in more detail at young children’s un-
derstanding of how causality operates in time, and perhaps to examine how this 
may be linked to other achievements we have mentioned in this section, such as 
children’s planning abilities, their ability to think counterfactually, their compre-
hension of temporal terms such as ‘before’ and ‘after’ and their ability to make 
judgments about the order of unrelated temporally distant events. More gener-
ally, developmental studies have not directly addressed when children first un-
derstand that facts about events in the past are unalterable but that facts about 
what will happen in the future are potentially alterable (though see Busby Grant 
& Suddendorf, 2010) — which we suggest children may grasp at Stage (b) — or 
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addressed when children grasp that what is alterable and non-alterable changes as 
one moves through time and differs from different temporal perspectives, which 
we suggest is a further developmental achievement.
2.4.  Stage (d): Abstract Time (>5 years)
We have put in a final stage in our model, which is a stage at which time is as-
sumed to be understood in a completely event-independent way. We are less con-
fident that this constitutes an entirely new stage in children’s comprehension of 
time, but we include this stage to capture the idea that once children master the 
conventional clock and calendar system, they have a way of describing and think-
ing about times that makes no reference to events at all.3 We suspect that until 
children have some mastery of such a system, they will inevitably think of times 
in a way that involves at least considering the events located at those times, even 
if children can distinguish mentally been an event and its time of occurrence. 
Moreover, it is likely that learning this system makes the nature of time itself more 
transparent: as Campbell (2006) argues “When the introduction of a calendar and 
clock system makes linearity explicit, this is a bold, simple stroke that clarifies our 
thinking about time.” (p. 11). The clock and calendar system provides a power-
ful new way of singling out temporal locations, and part of its power lies in the 
fact that it captures both repeated cycles (days, weeks, and years) and particular 
unique times. Clearly, mastery of this system is only achieved within the context 
of extensive socialization and typically as a result of direct teaching. Nevertheless, 
once children acquire this system they arguably possess a way of thinking about 
time itself that they did not have before.
In fact, full mastery of a clock and calendar system is a very slow developmental 
achievement (e.g., Friedman, 1977, 1986, 1991, 2000; see Friedman, 1982, 1989; 
McCormack, 2015, for reviews). Although by age 6 to 7, children can often report 
on what day of the week it is and can list the seasons in correct order (Friedman, 
1977, 1982, 1986, 1991), they can struggle with the cyclical aspect of the sys-
tem (for example, although they recognize that spring-summer-autumn-winter 
is the correct order, they may have difficulty judging that autumn-winter-spring-
summer is also a correct order). Children of 8 to 10 will typically have learnt the 
correct order of the months of the year, but still have less flexibility than adults 
in how they make use of the system, and can struggle to make judgments about, 
for example, which annual holiday or month comes next from the perspective 
of a different point in the year (Friedman, 1986, 2000). In fact, Friedman (1982, 
1986, 1989) has argued that there is a qualitative shift in adolescence in how 
3 Clocks and calendars are calibrated by natural events (and historical ones determine what counts 
as ‘year zero’) but they arguably provide those who use them with a way of thinking about times 
without having to think about those events.
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conventional time is represented. His argument is that children’s difficulties using 
the system flexibly stem from the fact that they initially represent only verbal lists 
of days and months, which are intrinsically directional and thus cause difficulties 
when making flexible judgments (e.g., those that involve thinking retrospective-
ly). He suggests that it is only in adolescence that individuals start to use spatial-
ized mental images of conventional time that support more flexible judgments.
3.  Explaining Developmental Change
As yet, we have said nothing about the nature of the developmental process, and 
in particular we have not made any claims about how children move from stage 
to stage. Moreover, we have not considered how the changes in the notion of time 
described here might be related to any changes in children’s acquisition of a con-
cept of duration — the question raised at the start of this paper. There is very little 
in the way of empirical evidence that can help us address either of these issues, 
but in this final section we make some remarks about them.
3.1.  Developmental Change, Language, and Social Interaction
To what extent are children’s emerging notions of time dependent on social ex-
perience and on language acquisition in particular? Historically, the idea that lin-
guistic experience shapes the conceptualization of time has been a well-known 
and controversial one, not least because of Whorf ’s (1941) influential analysis 
of time in Hopi language. Clearly, the conventional systems for measuring time 
and locating events in time are culturally specific and are only acquired by chil-
dren as a result of extensive direct teaching. We take the more difficult issue to 
be whether acquiring the more basic notions of time that we have highlighted in 
Stages (a)–(c) of our model is dependent on language and social experience. The 
most extensive discussion of this issue is provided by Nelson (1996). She argues 
that through their own experiences, children come to represent familiar event 
sequences. However, notions of time are only implicit in these representations, 
and it is only through acquisition of language that these implicit notions become 
explicit. Moreover, she claims that children’s first uses of temporal terms and lan-
guage are bound up with their event representations and as a result do not have 
the same meaning as those of adults; it is only gradually through shared discourse 
with adults about events that children acquire mature temporal notions. Notably, 
she believes that this is true not only with regard to the acquisition of convention-
al time systems (such as the clock and calendar system), but also with regard to 
more fundamental aspects of a notion of time, including the distinction between 
past, present, and future: “[L]anguage may make salient a type of relation that was 
not previously apparent in the child’s non-linguistic conceptual representations. 
Present evidence suggests that this may be the case for the tense system, bring-
ing out the distinction between past, present, and future. Prior to acquiring this 
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system children may distinguish only between the now and the not-now, or attend 
only to action relations in the here and how, the living present. In this case, the 
relation that must be expressed grammatically attunes the child to a relation to 
which she had previously been indifferent” (p. 289).
The central difficulty in assessing this argument empirically, and other claims 
about the role of language and social experience in children’s acquisition of tem-
poral concepts, is that is extremely difficult to know what sort of concept children 
have of time without examining their speech or using tasks that require language. 
Thus, it is difficult if not impossible to contrast what children understand about 
time before they acquire language with their subsequent understanding. Empiri-
cal evidence to support suggestions such as Nelson’s takes the form of trying to 
establish that when children first use (in this instance) tense, they do not seem to 
use it to mark the same distinctions as adults; this is then interpreted as indicating 
that they initially lack the distinction between past, present, and future that un-
derpins the adult use of the tensed system. Indeed, we considered some evidence 
of this sort in Section 2.2.
While we do not necessarily agree with all aspects of Nelson’s (1996) account, 
we suspect that she may be correct in assuming that acquiring fundamental tem-
poral notions may be something that hinges on acquiring language and engaging 
in shared discourse. Elsewhere, we have argued that engaging in shared reminis-
cence about the past (and shared discussion about the future) with adults may be 
critical in children acquiring a linear, unidirectional notion of time that is under-
pinned by a grasp of how causation operates in time (Hoerl, 2007; Hoerl & McCor-
mack, 2005; McCormack, 2015; see also Welch-Ross, 2001). The suggestion is that 
when parents and caregivers engage in talk about events at other times with chil-
dren, they are essentially scaffolding children to begin to take different temporal 
perspectives on events. For example, by adopting a different temporal perspective 
on an event that is now in the past, parents can help children understand that the 
very same event once had not yet unfolded and was still in the future. Similarly, it 
can illustrate how what did happen was both constrained by what had happened 
previously and also determined by what choices were made at the time. In this 
way, children may start to understand the causal connections between events lo-
cated at different points in time. While there is little empirical evidence to directly 
support the idea that such interactions are critical for acquisition of children’s 
notion of time, there is good evidence to indicate that these interactions support 
the development of children’s ability to form their own coherent and structured 
narratives about their personal past and future and to use temporal terms appro-
priately (Hudson, 2006; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
3.2.  A Single Process or Multiple Ones?
Finally, we began this article by distinguishing between two ways in which time 
features in people’s mental lives — time as a dimension of things that unfold in 
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time and time as a framework within which such things can be located — and 
have focused on the development of the second. Once children have mastered the 
clock and calendar system, we can be confident that they have integrated both of 
these aspects of the concept of time. However, we do not know whether these re-
ally are separable aspects of a concept of time that develop independently, and, if 
they are separable, how this integration is achieved. One possibility is that they are 
acquired in entirely separate developmental processes, and they become properly 
integrated only when children start to learn the clock and calendar system. The al-
ternative is that their acquisition depends on some of the same cognitive achieve-
ments and socio-cultural experiences. There is no empirical evidence that we are 
aware of that would help us decide between these alternatives.
We note, though, that whilst this paper has in particularly focused on the ques-
tion of the emergence of a capacity for event-independent thought in the context 
of children’s understanding of time as a framework, there is an important parallel 
issue regarding children’s understanding of time as a dimension, namely when 
children begin to think of duration in an event-independent way. That is, when 
can children think of a period of time as quantifiable, independent of whatever 
events actually occur during that time period? Indeed, answering this question is 
part of what the Piagetian research programme attempted to do, although by the 
questionable method of looking at when duration judgments were unaffected by 
other stimulus dimensions. Perhaps a better way to try to answer this question 
may be to look at when children begin to count in order to measure time inter-
vals, which could be interpreted as evidence that they understand that duration is 
quantifiable. Although children often do not count spontaneously before around 
8 years (Pouthas et al., 1995; Wilkening et al., 1987), children as young as 5 can 
be encouraged to count and it improves the accuracy of their duration judgments 
(Clement & Droit-Volet, 2006).
Other studies have shown that by the time children are five they can use 
some sort of metric to make judgments about the durations of events. Friedman 
(1990) showed that five-year-olds can use a rudimentary scale involving sand-
timers of different sizes in order to make judgments of the durations of every day 
events, suggesting that they have a way of thinking about duration — i.e., a single 
metric — that is uniform across different event types. More recently, Tillman and 
Barner (2015) asked children to make judgments about the relative durations of 
familiar events by indicating on a time line how long they thought the events lasted 
for, with one end of the time line being described as very short and the other end 
as very long. Using this technique, five-year-olds were able to make some discrimi-
nations in this way between familiar events of different durations, even though 
they showed poor knowledge of the durations of periods of time described using 
time words associated with the conventional clock and calendar system (seconds, 
minutes, hours, and days). Indeed, perhaps unsurprisingly, a proper grasp of the 
durations of periods of time corresponding to conventional time words seems 
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to be closely linked to children’s numerical skills, and continues to develop over 
middle childhood (Labrell et al., 2016).
Further research by Droit-Volet using a quite different technique also sheds 
light on the issue of when children have a concept of duration. Droit-Volet and 
Rattat (1999) trained three- and five-year-olds to make a cartoon picture appear 
by pressing a rubber squeezer for 5s; children of both age groups were able to 
learn to do this, consistent with other studies suggesting that three-year-olds can 
appropriately adjust their actions to demonstrate sensitivity to event duration 
(Droit-Volet & Coull, 2016; Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2007). They then used a transfer 
task in which children had to perform a different action but of the same duration 
of 5 s in order to see the cartoon picture. They found that while five-year-olds were 
able to transfer knowledge about appropriate duration to a different action, three-
year-olds were unable to do so. They argued that this suggests that by five years 
(but not before) children can not only time their actions appropriately, but they 
also have a concept of duration that is sufficiently abstracted from the specific 
events filling a duration to allow them to succeed on the transfer test.
Taken together, these studies suggest that by five years, children have some 
concept of duration that is event-independent, i.e., that they understand that 
events last for a certain amount of time, and that even for periods filled with dif-
ferent types of events it is possible to compare the amount of time that they take. 
Rattat and Droit-Volet (2007, p. 282) refer to this as a concept of “homogeneous 
time abstracted from events”. We note that the age in question (around five years) 
is around the same age as we suggest children reach Stage (c) of our model, i.e., 
when they begin to think about the domain of time in which events can be located 
in an event-independent way. Both conceptual achievements — being able to rep-
resent the domain of time in a linear, event-independent way, and possessing a 
concept of duration — pave the way for children to begin to acquire knowledge 
of the clock and calendar system, although this learning process takes a long time 
for children to complete.
As we stated above, there is little empirical evidence that allows us to judge 
whether acquiring these two notions of time depends on separable processes. 
However, we note that there is a hint from Tillman et al.’s (2017) recent study 
of children’s understanding of deictic terms that while four- to five-year-olds can 
represent time as a linear domain of ordered locations, they may not yet properly 
integrate this with knowledge about the lengths of periods of time. Children of 
this age were able to appropriately order temporal locations on a time line rela-
tive to each other (e.g., place ‘yesterday’ to the right of ‘last year’ or ‘next week’ to 
the left of ‘next year’), but their placements suggested they were much poorer at 
judging the relative durations of the period of time between the event and the 
current moment in time (e.g., that ‘next year’ is considerably farther from the pres-
ent than ‘tomorrow’). This suggests that while they may have some grasp of the 
ordering of times in the past and future, they find it hard to put this together with 
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information about how much time there is between the present and these other 
times. Clearly, these findings address primarily children’s understanding of tem-
poral terms (some of which are associated with the conventional calendar system, 
and a proper grasp of which must require numerical skills), so it is difficult to 
judge to what extent this reflects conceptual difficulties. A promising line of psy-
cholinguistic research, though, would be to examine relations between children’s 
understanding of temporal terms referring to duration and children’s understand-
ing of deictic temporal terms.
4.  Conclusion
We have proposed a stage-like developmental model of the acquisition of tem-
poral concepts, but, as we acknowledge above, this model is still speculative. As 
we have pointed out, there is as yet no agreed set of experimental tasks used to 
study children’s temporal concepts. In proposing our model we have drawn in part 
on existing literature in psycholinguistics, much of which has looked at children’s 
spontaneous use of tensed or temporal language. While this is indeed a rich source 
of data, we suspect that until there are established empirical paradigms testing 
the specific aspects of children’s understanding of time that we have detailed in 
this paper, this area of cognitive development will remain relatively neglected. 
And part of the difficulty in coming up with such paradigms lies in designing tasks 
that do not simply test children’s understanding of language itself.
We have focused in this paper on children’s emerging understanding of time 
as a domain in which events can be located, but we have also mentioned the im-
portance of studying children’s acquisition of the concept of duration. In looking 
across both aspects of temporal cognition (time as a dimension, time as frame-
work), what needs to develop is an event-independent way of thinking about 
time. This is the central developmental achievement, and, as we have argued, it is 
one that is likely to happen in degrees.
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